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Should Contentment be a Key Aim in Higher Education? 
nsumer 
Abstract 
 
Higher education institutions are major concentrations of political, social, economic, 
intellectual and communicative resources. They reach freely across populations and 
cultures, and connect to government, professions, industry and the arts.  The neo-liberal 
logic of markets has entered the realm of (higher) education. Marketing functions centre 
on the creation, codification and transmission of knowledge, and the certification of 
graduates and the nature of education are commercialised, both in provision and in 
curriculum content. This leads to discourse on the benefits of education being positioned 
almost exclusively in terms of their effect on income.  
The perspective taken in the paper is the development of a happiness motive which 
asks education to challenge what it is to be a member of society: what moral and 
ontological stance one will seek to take in developing one’s future. The satisfied student 
perpetuates the current lifeworld in which they find themselves, seeking to improve the 
quality of the services provided. It is proposed that an overly-emphasised desire-
satisfaction culture inhibits the edifying mission of universities. This is not to argue against 
high quality service provision but to differentiate it from the edifying role of personal 
challenge, determination and social responsibility conceptualised here as profound 
happiness or contentment, and the university’s role in its development. It calls for a 
different and more refreshing approach to higher education, which is losing its shape and 
‘morphing’ into socially-experienced training provision 
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Introduction 
The notion that education is the provision of intellectual and emotional desire satisfaction 
has tended to become a driver of university strategy, reflecting how institutionalised 
education (in some, but by no means all cases) has been interpreted in this consumerist 
epoch. Roberts (2013) writes that education now seems actually to be about promoting 
desire satisfaction, often in ways that are not implicit for education but that create 
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pleasurable and measurable experiences. It is this shift of emphasis from the nature of 
edification which might be pleasurable to where the edifying experiences are required to be 
pleasures is s significant change in educational policy. Moreover, the effects of this change is 
compounded as what is taken as pleasurable is that which satisfies certain desired attributes 
of the input processes of being educated not in the more ontologically difficult notion of 
learning as becoming .  These inputs and the level of their satisfactory delivery prove 
conducive to be measured and measured they must to justify the returns on the investment 
made in them both by the students and others in the education process. The value for 
money imperative has led to the fetish of unquestioned metrics which prompts simple 
comparisons of the complex that lead to the invasion of pedagogical policy and practice. 
Satisfaction metrixs are used to build reputation, inform educational policy and create 
conformity. Moreover, they represent an agenda for desire satisfaction that is an 
extravagant, imagined sea of opportunity (favoured by advocates of education as a means to 
an end through accreditation which increases social capital through levels of employment) 
and not one where a tempering of achievement is obtained through balancing capabilities 
and potentiality. Indeed, the current context of education seems to emphasise anxiety of 
failure in getting right job and income and thus fear and dissonance  for one’s decisions 
about one’s future. 
This paper considers higher education from an alternative perceptive of contentment and 
tries to develop a clarity between that and happiness and desire satisfaction.  Such clarity is 
needed as the terms are often conflated leading to confusion in practice.  I seek to do this by 
reference to Heidegger and especially to  his distinction between emotions (in my terms; 
happiness, joy) which are brief and transitory and moods (contentment, anxiety0 which are 
fundamental and reveal the world to use.  These of course intermingle but are distinctive in 
their temporal relevance.    
 
The notion of happiness, satisfaction contentment 
The etymology of the terms shows a closeness and interrelationship between all three terms 
being contented, satisfied and happy.  Indeed it seems that the dominate term is happiness 
for it can act as meaning giving in a number of ways.  Indeed the literature often uses 
happiness as a prefix to discussing desire satisfaction and contentment. however in this 
paper I want to deliberately hold them apart  albeit for the time being under the rubic of 
happiness. I will suggest that in education the dominate idea of happiness is one of rationale 
self-interest and contrast this with notion of happiness that of first desire preference  
satisfaction and thirdly emotional.  I then develop a notion of emotional happiness which is 
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based on the temporality of emotions and moods found in Heidegger to argue for a 
distinction between happiness and contentment and then development an argument why 
contentment ought to be an educational goal whist not dismissing the other form of 
happiness   
The Rational 
The educational philosopher Dearden points out that ‘education may be broadly defined as 
the process of learning through which we come to an understanding and appreciation of 
what is valuable or worth pursuing in life, and happiness is no more than one among several 
final ends worthy of pursuit’ (1968: 27). However, what is meant by happiness? Briefly 
Dearden’s contribution follows the Aristotelian prescription of well-being (1984) that shares 
the focus on the distinctive human attributes of rationality and desire found in Augustine 
(2010), Epicurus (2013) and, more recently, Mill (2008), Russell (2006), Dewey (2012), 
Noddings (2003), Standish, Smeyers and Smith (2006), Dewey (1966), Haybron, 2009), 
White (2012) and Greve (2012). These ideas assume the socially good person to be a happy 
person as no rational person would make choices that were against their own happiness and 
this, of course, is contestable.  It is countered by Kant’s argument that happiness cannot be a 
final end in itself, hinging on the observation that, although we are naturally drawn to our 
own happiness, such a drive is not necessarily mediated through reason (and, through 
reason, to duty). What might the other mediating forces be?  For argument sake I have 
considered them as forces that satisfy desire preferences  and moods and emotions. 
Desire satisfaction 
The notion of what might be called desire theories of happiness depends on 
identifying preferences. The degree to which these are satisfied determines a level of 
happiness (Sumner, 1999). Clearly, these preferences can be base or cultured, rich or 
superficial, and share a desire in utility to prevent pain and enhance pleasure. Their 
commonality is in hedonism, informed (having an appreciation of the nature of the objects of 
desire and its prudential impact (Griffin, 1988) or doxic. Their satisfaction can be achieved 
by a confluence of concepts that produce occurrent enjoyment or dispositional happiness 
(Davis, 1981; Haybron, 2009). Such desires tend to be informed by experience and the 
expectations of others, and reflective of the world in which one operates. Moreover, given 
the fragility and susceptibility of desires over time, they tend not to have any basis on which 
to judge happiness; although they offer an explanation of certain, often instrumental 
behaviours, these are not necessarily the emotions that accompany their achievement. 
Furthermore, there have been sustained critiques of these theories on the premise that one 
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might either remain unhappy if one’s desires are met, or be happy even when one desires fail 
to be met (Feldman, 2012).  
Indeed, as Sumner points out, ‘enjoyment and suffering always require intentional objects, 
feelings of happiness and unhappiness can be non-referential’ (1999: 147). Moreover, while 
‘notions of enjoyment may be adequate for capturing many happy feelings, it seems much 
too tepid for the heights of rapture and bliss’ (ibid). Sumner’s insights are reflected in the 
discussion I offer in the following pages, which relates the notions of happiness, their 
temporality and fundamental mood or disposition of contentment. I try to deconstruct 
different forms of emotion and moods, and argue that subtleties in meaning are relevant to 
the development of happiness, well-being and utility. This is in opposition to Easterlin 
(2005), who sees no need to differentiate concepts that determine the way entities and 
events are disclosed to us. 
The argument against desire satisfaction is not one that seeks asceticism or neglect of the 
value for money discourse that pervades much of higher education policy. Having an 
environment conducive to study, adequate resources and competent teaching are important, 
but these are contextual conditions, for the most part, relating to desire and wants that 
transverse the being in our world. Satisfaction of them does not enable learning or personal 
development (although they may contribute to short-term happiness). They are 
instrumental to, not the ends of, an educative process that is expressive of one’s being; they 
are neither transformative nor ontologically significant; they are prudentially historic. In 
developing a theory of contentment that might act as an educative aim is not to replace 
desire satisfaction as an occurrent phenomenon of enjoyment, but to nurture the 
dispositional goal of contentment.  To do this I need to turn to moods and emotions. 
Moods 
Moods are taken in the Heideggerian sense as the way we experience being part of 
our world and they set the way in which we interpret it. They are fundamental, and are 
more primordial than emotions. According to Ratcliffe, ‘moods, for Heidegger, give sense to 
Dasein’s world and to the manner in which Dasein finds itself relating to the world’ 
(Ratcliffe, 2002). This distinguishes them from emotions, which have an intentionality, and 
are brief episodes with specific objects, whereas moods are longer-term states that either do 
not have objects or encompass a wide range of objects. Emotional states presuppose a world 
of background moods that make them possible (Ratcliffe, 2013). We have a number of 
fundamental moods that enable us to engage successfully (or otherwise) with our world and 
those within in it.4  
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Contentment 
Contentment is not the happiness we might associate with, sensual desire satisfaction or, as 
Ahmed (2010) has illustrated, the happiness we are obliged to embrace but, following 
Heidegger, is a state of being content with oneself. Contentment in becoming what one wills 
one’s being to be, in the knowledge of one’s capabilities. It arises from the convergence of 
differint emotions such as happiness, frustration and despair. The approach involves an 
educative process of developing potential capabilities and a realistic appreciation of what 
this means for one, being in the world with others. It is not fanciful and it denies that one 
can be whatever one fantasises; replacing this with a notion of contentment with what one 
might feasibly be (see Gibbs & Dean, 2014). To find our potential to be and to will its 
realisation requires the disruption of our tranquillity, and a heightened awareness and 
realisation of the core structural capabilities of critical thinking, confidence and citizenship. 
Securing these capabilities is emotionally unsettling, distressing and creates temporary 
negations to contentment but, in doing so—provided we experience them as part of our 
understanding of ourselves through attunement to the mood of contentment rather than 
anxiety—these capabilities bring benefits for individual growth.  
This approach differs from the two main thrusts of literature concerned with 
happiness studies: well-being, leading to the Aristotelian Phronimos or the Confucian Junzi, 
and the desire hedonism of Epicurus and Mencius. It differs from judgements of well-being 
made retrospectively about an accumulation of satisfied lifelong desires, and from the 
explicit and normative directives of what is prudently good for one. In this sense, 
contentment is not strictly the Aristotelian eudaimonia that prioritises well-being based on 
moral, wealth or health imperatives, although it does retain notions of agentic directed 
growth, meaning and purpose informed by societal norms, whilst not being restricted to 
them. I can be content and virtuous, but I do not need to be virtuous to be content.5   
Contentment’s sustainable notion of happiness also differs from that of hedonism. In 
this respect it aligned with Emund Burke’s eighteen century notion that pleasure should not 
be contrasted with  pain for they are not negations of each other in that” removal of great pain 
does not resemble positive pleasure” (2015: 30) separated by indifference or tranquillity 
Although it certainly finds a place for the presence of joy and momentary outbreaks of 
expression of delight and pleasure, it is not reliant on extrinsically directed and generated 
pleasures, and is an intrinsic state of awareness. Contentment, then, is a blend of both these 
traditional forms of happiness theory, realised through one’s temporal being, and 
interpreted and understood from a mood of contentment with the living of a willed life plan 
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revealed through attunement. It is one’s mood that becomes attuned to one’s being within 
the consequences of one’s agentic capabilities. It is being able to strive realistically to know 
the best one can be, and not the best anyone else might want one to be. It is not, as Haybron 
(2009: 147) suggests, an affirmation of one life but a revealing of the way one’s life might be. 
It is not in the world, for nothing in and of itself holds a happiness quality,6 but in the way 
we interpret the world. 
Significantly, for Heidegger, the affectiveness of our being ‘has already disclosed, in 
every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself 
towards something’ (1962: 176). These fundamental attunements shape how we experience 
the world and things within it and, together with discourse and understanding, determine 
how we make ourselves meaningful and grasp our world (Heidegger calls this ‘care’). The 
objects that the joy, happiness or sadness trigger are revealed because of a mood that 
determines the way of making one’s way in the world. These outbursts last for the duration 
of the stimulus and, once gone, depending on our fundament attunement, leave us 
somewhere between distress and contentment. However, we are not at the mercy of moods. 
Heidegger asserts that we ‘should and must, through knowledge and will, become master of 
its moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of volition and 
cognition’ (1962: 175). 
This structure of emotions and moods might have reasoned with Shun’s 
interpretation of the Confucian invulnerable ethical person. Here, the ‘primacy of the ethical’ 
(Shun, 2014) determines the way in which the world presents itself to the Junzi, not as a 
disruptive way of being in the world but as a way of being-in-the-world. It is a fundamental 
attunement to the contentment of the ethical. The invulnerability comes from taking a 
stance and living it, in the way of the ethical. Shun evokes Mencius’ unmoved mind to 
establish this stance. Indeed, it could be suggested that the struggle to achieve such a 
position would see the contentment proposed here as invulnerable. However, this model of 
contentment allows for a less demanding form of resilience that might claim an ideological 
rather than an ethical state of mind. If allowed within a Confucian analysis, this type of 
contentment could be considered vulnerable. Such a distinction helps in allowing the notion 
of contentment to be a fundamental attunement to one’s life, without requiring the practice 
of a Phrónimos or a Junzi to be contingent upon it.  
Temporality of contentment  
Moods, along with other aspects of care, are to be analysed in terms of temporality, 
according to Heidegger. The tripartite structure of time utilised (Gibbs, 2010) identifies 
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temporality of being in the world in three senses. In the first, ordinary time—the time of 
emotion—is calculative or experienced as a present extended in time, in external 
measurable time. In this state of temporal isolation our past and our future operate with ‘in-
the-moment’ joy or despair. We risk violating our being if we do not reconnect with the 
primordial temporary of Care, the temporal form of contentment. The second form of 
temporality, world time, is spatial time, where events are located with respect to other 
events; not by their duration as measured in clock time but in terms of their temporal 
juxtaposition. Past, present and future all play a role in the location, but not the experience, 
of present time. Last, the temporality of mood (originary temporality) is that of the 
integration of past, present and future in the moment of being: ‘The primordial unity of the 
structure of care lies in temporality’ (Heidegger, 1962: 375). As Gibbs suggests, ‘all three 
modes of time are bound together degeneratively and dependently; ordinary time is a 
degenerative form of world time, and world time is a degenerative from of originary 
temporality’ (2010: 392). 
Like Heidegger’s profound boredom, the phenomenon of contentment may take 
three distinctive forms, I suggest, reflecting their temporality. The first is emotional 
eruptions of joy, pleasure, gratification, bliss, lust or ecstasy, when there is a specific focus 
for the explicit show of happiness in an episodic fashion; a happiness directed towards 
something. The episodic emotions irrupt from propensity to any mood, although most likely 
from a disposition to find engagements happy (Haybron, 2009). The second manifestation of 
underlying happiness is a feeling akin to a shallow cheeriness without substance; a 
cheeriness or musing that is empty, not evoked by any specific external event but by a state 
of limbo, a temporal standing (Heidegger, 1995: 122). This might be called ‘whatever’ 
happiness. It is a satisfied state that is a reproduction of exciting norms of society and is 
specific to each epoch, currently consumerism. One smiles at a gift but assesses its financial 
worth rather than its meaning and regrets it is not different; laughs with others but is 
emotionally unmoved; and maintains an episodic cheerfulness and then wonders why.  
The third is ontological and is an attunement to our own being’s happiness, the 
fundamental happiness of willing and then enacting one’s being. This is represented as 
contentment and revealed in one’s engagement with one’s being through taking a stance on 
fitting into that being, ‘being happily me’. Willing such a being is neither constant nor 
stable, but enduring. Normally, our attunements are appropriate to our willed becoming 
within the world of action and, if we become dysfunctional in our dominant way of dealing 
with the world we are not able to experience other appropriate attunements (anxiety) and 
emotions (fear). This is through a discourse; a hermeneutic reading of the world 
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foregrounded in our mood. Heidegger also maintains that modes of interpretation enabled 
by discourse may serve to determine the range of possible moods. Attunement creates an 
engagement with others and, in this sense, it is a ‘kinesthetic and emotional sensing of 
others knowing their rhythm, affect and experience’ (Erskine, 1998). As Heidegger 
observed, the effect is to create an atmosphere that can change the disposition of everyone in 
the vicinity.  
 Each of these three realisations of happiness is accompanied by a dominant notion of 
temporality (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Contrasting forms of happiness7 
 Directed happiness ‘Whatever’ happiness Contentment 
General 
distinction 
Conspicuous 
expression of a happy 
emotional state of joy, 
bliss or ecstasy. A loss 
in the moment, 
anticipated present and 
then gone.  
Inconspicuous 
occurrence of passing 
time, hidden from 
oneself and taken as a 
disposition—‘he is a 
cheery soul’. Directed at 
the public-ness of 
others. 
An attunement to 
one’s existential being. 
A feeling of fitting 
with oneself regardless 
of others around one—
informed contentment. 
Notion of 
time 
Datable time, that is, 
events located in 
relation to others. It is 
the shaping of 
separated notions of 
past, present and 
future. 
Time is linear and 
progressive. It is the 
shaping of separated 
notions of past, present 
and future. 
Originary or 
primordial time, the 
time in which we make 
sense of ourselves, 
temporality 
temporalised in the 
present.  
Range of 
resonance 
Being forced between 
particularly happy 
events. 
Dissipation of happiness 
as a cheeriness 
throughout the whole 
situation. 
Contentment with 
agentic being. 
Happiness 
in relation 
to a 
situation 
Bounded in a situation, 
limited by extrinsic 
circumstances. 
Not bound to a 
particular situation, but 
a way of acting for 
others in their world. 
All-embracing. 
 
Contentment is the freedom of self-determination within the context of a chosen world 
view. Fundamental happiness, as distinct from episodic happiness—whether intense joy, 
eruptions of trivial pleasure or scrutinised notions of what is good for one—is not restricted 
to what others think and attempt to determine, but to one’s own stance. It is not the 
satisfaction of exciting preferences, but the securing of one’s action in a life plan of one’s 
being. This position allows for happiness to be cross-cultural and embraces faith as well as 
pragmatism, all in a non-economic stoic form of willed intention. It is about one’s fit within 
one’s being, so as to flourish in the world of, but not resolved by, others.  
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Soft and hard authenticity 
The contentment envisioned here requires personal awareness and taking a stance on what 
is feasible for one to be, yet it requires neither virtuous living (although it might be aided by 
it), nor dependency on a joyous life after death, while it may include both. It is no easy task 
to will one’s being, to take a stance on one’s being, which is existentially sustainable and 
brings contentment. It is a role that higher education should facilitate through bringing an 
awareness of attunement to moods to its presentation of emotional as well as propositional 
knowledge. Understanding and interpreting one’s potential to be within one’s world 
requires education, vision, courage and tenacity. These are necessary if one is to ascertain 
how one’s being fits best alongside others, without compromising one’s being for the sake of 
merely fitting in for the fleeting benefit of others’ comfort. 
According to Heidegger, this process of taking a stance is the ownership of our own 
choices, and ownership leads to authenticity. These choices are dependent upon specifics 
open to each of us in our average, everyday existence. For Heidegger, Dasein should not be 
‘interpreted with the differentiated character [Differenz] of some definite way of existing, 
but that it should be uncovered’ (1962: 69); it is not prescribed, but unfolds in how we 
engage with the world. In it revealed by being in the world and is a form of being that is a 
condition of one’s socio-historical context. Guignon points to the constancy of this 
authenticity that leads to ‘the “sober joy” of an authentic existence: when one seizes hold of 
one’s life with deceive-ness and clarity’ (Guignon, 1993: 233). Moreover, for Heidegger, 
making choices on one’s being cannot be based solely on any external value judgement of 
what the authentic ought to be; neither is it a rejection of the inauthentic as a ‘bad’ way of 
being. Here, self-understanding implies a form of interpretation that is Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic circle; it is ontological, not ethical—‘our own Interpretation is purely 
ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein’ 
(ibid: 211).  
This soft interpretation of authenticity does not try to reject tradition, but seeks to 
understand the heritage of tradition in how these choices are revealed and made available. 
In this sense, eudemonic calls for personal well-being as some form of good variety of 
happiness is undertaken from the inauthentic position of authority, ‘oppressing other 
diverse ways-of-being’ (Trubody, 2015: 29). It is here that a value base of a worthy and 
moral state of authentic happiness differs from both the contentment proposed here and 
from the argument made by Chen (2013). In the former, a formalised notion of authenticity 
and happiness assumes external standards that one has to match—being excellent, being a 
better person, and so on. This is not my reading of Heidegger and it leads Trubody to talk 
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of a ‘cult of the authentic’ (2015). This authenticity is prescriptive in attributing value to 
authenticity, as opposed to inauthenticity, and sees contentment as poiesis. This 
distinguishes contentment from both equanimity - a state of emotional indifference and 
more associated with the second notion of happiness and tranquillity which is an isolation 
from being-with-others in the world; a form of personal alienation.  Both remain as 
expression of are fundamental moods with tranquillity grounded in a fundamental 
emptiness (Heidegger 1995:162) and equanimity is a form of limbo where we are“interested 
neither in the object nor in the result of the activity, but in being occupied as such and in this 
alone. We are seeking to be occupied in any way. Why? Merely so as not to fall into this 
being left empty” (ibid 101). 
For Heidegger, authenticity is embedded in ‘das Man’: our need to conform (at least 
in the development of a discourse) to the traditions and practices that make our world 
intelligible to us. If conformity becomes conformism, however, the need for conformity may 
also deprive us of any originality of purpose. Often, it is only when we are forced to question 
what we take as the way to be, for instance when inconspicuous acts reveal themselves in 
failure, that our conformity is revealed and we question our own stance and that of others. 
King has argued from a Heideggerian perspective that this corresponds to a sense of fitting 
in, in that ‘we can ascribe fittingness to our lives (or elements of our lives, such as our 
careers, our family arrangements, or our desires and aspiration) when our lives are 
somehow appropriate to us’ (2009: 10).  
Contentment within Higher Education 
Contentment, then, is necessarily neither a consequence of well-being nor suffering for some 
sense of eternal contentment after mortal life. It is about finding and knowing one’s place in 
the world; fitting in through self-meaningful ways. It comes about by engagement and 
questioning, and requires the development of capabilities upon which these questions might 
be based and responses interpreted. Higher education, I propose, ought to give students the 
privileged space to pursue what they want themselves to be. By making this proposal I am 
asserting that a purpose of higher education must surely be the development of a criticality 
in students, both of the circumstances in which one finds oneself and of one’s own action 
within these circumstances. Providing such a context for reflection ought to be a 
responsibility of higher education institutions, and taking such time to step aside from the 
totalising consumerism of our everydayness is the student’s obligation to this gifted time. 
To misuse the privilege by busying oneself with what is, rather than what might be, I would 
suggest, is an abuse of privilege (see Gibbs, 2009). Indeed, many strive for it, and some 
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succeed, but it is not something higher education can gift. It requires personal engagement 
from students. I am not, of course, proposing that higher education ought to have no 
economic purpose, but that this has become an overpowering discourse. Nor am I 
suggesting that contentment is not evident in higher education, alongside satisfaction 
(although they are not the same thing (Gibbs & Dean, 2014). Rather, contentment should be 
considered as a goal for higher education alongside other goals, to be set against the needs 
of the institution in measuring student satisfaction.  
Education ought to provide an arena for the development of our potential and a 
place to be unsettled—unhappy, if you will—in the realisation that one has yet more to 
learn, and in this way to discuss the realistic potentials rather than any ungrounded 
imaginary choices about which one might fantasise. To do this, one must be in the ‘right 
mood’: a mood of contentment. In order to be plausible, the choices we make need to be 
adapted to and tested against personal circumstances, not to predetermine or to truncate 
options but to allow the development of feasible ways to plan to be. We need to evade the 
impositions of others’ moods and to learn to find for ourselves the right mood with which to 
replace them (Heidegger, 1962: 175). This can be unpleasant, creating short-term 
dissatisfaction. It may create a state of despairi (see Roberts, 2013, 2016) from which we 
cannot find happiness either through solitude or immersed citizenship. Both can be 
facilitated by education, but neither can achieve it by a totalising type of public education 
that matters more to the state than the individual (accompanied by intense surveillance), or 
a solitary kind of study that renders one isolated in a world of social activity to the extent 
that it renders real solitude impossible. Where this analysis leads us is to consider that 
discomfort is fearful only when is it interpreted as such from an attunement to anxiety; and, 
since moods constitute the way in which things matter to us, if we change the mood we 
change the way they matter.  
Moreover, if we crudely follow Rorty (1999) in that higher education’s duty is to 
encourage irony from the socialisation of compulsory education, then higher education and 
its institutions represent a space for this questioning to take place. Further, it might be 
claimed that higher education has a duty to offer such a space and not to close it out with 
the business of service delivery based on pleasure, entertainment and job grooming. It is in 
the Heideggerian sense of a fundamental attunement8 to the world through the mood of 
contentment that we find ourselves disposed to be in the world with others; open to them 
and not constrained by the consumerism entrapment of a notion of belonging by 
consuming. Heidegger talks damningly and directly about how consumerism is abandoning 
Being through letting one’s ‘will be unconditionally equated with the process 
Should Satisfaction Be a Higher Educative Aim? The case for contentment 
[consumerism] and thus becomes at the same time the “object” of the abandonment of 
Being’ (1973: 107, author’s brackets). He continues in a prophetic attack on consumerism as 
the totalising power, held by a few globalised leaders, to negate our understanding of our 
being: the ‘circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption is the sole procedure 
which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an unworld’ 
(1973: 107). 
For example, if learning is consumption and consuming is a never-ending 
requirement of consumerism, then failing to learn fast is a failure of consumption and to be 
feared. However, if failure to learn quickly reveals issues about oneself that can be explored 
over time, it might bring deeper understanding or even acceptance that something is 
personally unlearn-able. Either way, one is content with the educational struggle when one 
accepts its reality. Such contentment does not seek an end to learning. It is a moving and 
ceaseless state of learning, ready to face the unanticipated future resolutely as oneself.  
It is a mode of practice where the poles of action and holding back form a mode of 
disclosing and affirming within oneself what is understood to be practised. Such disclosing 
is through our attunement to a mood. When this is contentment, it brings a sense of hope 
(Rorty, 1999). To manage this issue requires thinking about what education is intent in 
doing for ‘true happiness consists in decreasing the difference between our desires and our 
powers, in establishing a perfect equilibrium between power and the will’ (Rousseau, 2013: 
39).  
Rather than an economic acquisition agenda that has resulted in practices that deny 
students potentially valuable educational experiences, a university should challenge 
students to develop the capabilities to optimise their potential to make responsible, or at 
least informed, choices. This may often be achieved through more space in the curriculum to 
‘potter about’, to follow the byways of their curiosity and not worry about learning 
outcomes or assessment criteria. These are designed to fill up time, to create the urgency of 
immediate demand and to induce a fear of forgetting who you are. Such adventures may 
often be painfully uncomfortable yet, in and of itself, this does not diminish the mood of 
contentment but strengthens students’ resolve and resilience to create a personal identity 
within the context of being a member of society. As Heidegger claims, ‘real education lays 
hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of 
our essential being and accustoming us to it’ (1998: 167).  
How, then, should higher education provide an educative environment for the 
development of contentment in the face of the anxiety of consumer demands? It first needs 
to take its own stance on what is an edifying experience—one where the economic 
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imperative of improved human capital is not allowed to become a quest to make learning 
merely pleasurable, painless and easy to consume. For Heidegger, teaching and learning, or 
putting ‘oneself on a journey, to experience, means to learn’ (1971: 143). The teaching of 
philosophy as exemplified by the Socratic dialogues with Theaetetus is a good example, as is 
the contemporary teaching of literature and drama through which students become engaged 
with human contexts and emotions. Learning is about thinking about and addressing that 
which confronts us and may be painful, frustrating and negative. It is about dealing with the 
world and being prepared to act. Education should not be to hide the uncomfortable or the 
despair of unrealisable goals behind a neoliberal imperative of consumerism, and breaking 
away from this enframement of the anxiety supports and embraces an openness to the 
world. An attunement to contentment rather than anxiety applies, of course, to staff as well 
as students, in order that what truly matters in education may be revealed. 
This could lead to pedagogy of contentment which should be radical, at the centre of 
higher education as a social good and should enable and facilitate students taking a stance 
on their being and their agency with others develop through engagement with societal 
problems.  It is where the confluence of ideas,  cultures and powers determine action both 
within and external to the educational institution. Faced with the realities of sustainability 
such a pedagogy has it core experiential learning through action   It will develop both 
contentment within themselves and resilience to engage with the world of work and civic 
responsibility and face despair positively. A pedagogy of contentment is not about passivity 
but awareness and engagement with others to seek a better place to live.  It is liberal in the 
sense of wide ranging and transdisciplinary in seeks engagement with pressing societal 
problems without the constraint of disciplines but with the insight that they offer. At the 
core of a pedagogy of contentment is knowing one’s place in the world and understanding 
the despair of failure, struggle and elation of achievement and balances these in a personal 
attunement to the world.  
Roberts suggests that to be ‘educated is, in part, to be aware of one’s despair, 
accepting of it, and able to work productively with it’ (2013: 464)9. This, I argue, is not 
found in an attunement of anxiety where notions of desire satisfaction are directed at 
education, but in a pre-existing mood of contentment, where things that matter are not 
viewed as fearful or fearless. Rather, they are viewed as contributing, either positively or 
negatively, to one’s explored sense of being oneself open to, but not enslaved by, others. 
This, I believe, is at the core of the common good that many still suggest is a function of 
higher education. 
 
Should Satisfaction Be a Higher Educative Aim? The case for contentment 
Notes 
1  Following Ratcliffe, ‘attunement’ is chosen as a translation of Heidegger’s use of Befindlichkeit. 
Alternatives include ‘state of mind’, as used by Macquarrie and Robinson (Heidegger, 1962), but this 
implies that moods constitute a sense of being part of a world, rather than pre-subjective and pre-
objective. 
2  Bauman (2007) links the two by claiming that assuaging boredom is a measure of a happy life. I make no 
such claim. 
3  Heidegger alludes to a number of profound moods and develops an analysis of two; anxiety (in Being and 
Time; and boredom in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. It is in the Metaphysics that Heidegger talks of 
a range of fundamental moods, but does not pursue more than boredom. 
4  There is a potential linkage with the notion of xi喜, le 樂 and you憂, as discussed by Shun (2014). 
5  This is opposite to Rousseau who, in his letter to D’Offreville (Gourevitch, 1997), wrote that you can 
only be content if you are honest, yet you can be honest and not content, and is supported by 
Tatarkiewicz’ analysis (1976). 
6  Similar can be found in Kraut’s Against Absolute Goodness (2011). 
7  Evidence to support the temporal and emotional structures of happiness and contentment can be found in 
recent works in the study of happiness (e.g. Diener, 1984; Shmotkin, 2005). They differ from Heidegger 
mainly in the temporal modes of a distinct past, present and future. While they do not reflect his notion 
of being’s fundamental attunement, realised in a state of ‘originary’ or primordial temporality, they 
accord with the notion of contentment as an enduring temporal notion. Ş imş ek (2009) has proposed a 
construct of subjective well-being as ‘one’s evaluation of life in both past and future time perspectives in 
addition to the present’ (2009: 505), and as a life project created and maintained in a temporal perspective 
(Simsek and Kocayörük, 2012). By evoking Heidegger, Simsek (2009) argues that time, ‘when considered 
as a basic ontological category, transforms the concept of “life as a personal project” into one more 
abstract: “life as a project of becoming”, which is the chief good as the indicator of a happy life’ (ibid: 511). 
8 ‘It is clear that attunements are not something merely at hand. They themselves are precisely a 
fundamental manner and fundamental way of being, indeed of being-there [Da-sein], and this always 
directly includes being with one another’ (Heidegger, 1995: 67). 
9 As Roberts comments here has been surprisingly little philosophical work on the significance of despair in 
educational life. Notable exceptions include that of Liston (2000), who speaks not of student despair but 
of that of teachers. However, rather than wishing to destroy this despair, he accepts that it is not a matter 
of an individual’s unmet needs and expectations—it is part of the structure of teaching. He links it to the 
vulnerability of teaching as a public sharing of our personal love of learning. A different conception is 
provided by McKnight (2004), Nielsen (2006) and Roberts (2013, 2016) who, through the existential lens 
of Kierkegaard, see dialectic as an educational process that unveils self-discourse as ethical discourse. 
Indeed, Kierkegaard’s work features in much of the limited literature 
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